Many talk of China
"rising." Chinese view their fortunes as a return to greatness from a
"century of humiliation" -- and not a rise from nothing.
Since taking over as the new leader of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in November, Xi
Jinping has created a heated discussion in China and abroad over his use of the
phrase, “Chinese Dream.” In his various public speeches, he has repeatedly emphasized that
achieving the Chinese Dream of a
"great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation" was
his government’s main objective. While this has been applauded enthusiastically
at home, people outside of China have struggled to ascertain the precise
meaning of Xi’s statement. This is unfortunate because the Chinese Dream is
essential for understanding how a “rising” China views itself and its role in
the world. Failure to understand its meaning will thus heighten the chances for
misunderstanding, with potentially devastating consequences for all parties
involved.
Although outsiders almost
always speak of China’s “rise,” the Chinese like to refer to their
impressive recent achievements and future planned development as “rejuvenation”
(fuxing). The use of that word underscores an important point: the
Chinese view their fortunes as a return to greatness and not a rise from
nothing. In fact, rejuvenation is deeply rooted in Chinese history and the
national experience, especially with regards to the so-called “century of
national humiliation” that began with the First Opium War (1839–1842) and
lasted through the end of the Sino-Japanese War in 1945. China’s memory of this
period as a time when it was attacked, bullied, and torn asunder by
imperialists serves as the foundation for its modern identity and purpose.
Specifically, as proud
citizens of the “Middle Kingdom” the Chinese feel a strong sense of chosenness
and are extremely proud of their ancient and modern achievements. This pride is
tempered, however, by the lasting trauma seared into the national conscious as
a result of the country’s humiliating experiences at the hands of Western and
Japanese imperialism. After suffering a humiliating decline in national
strength and status, the Chinese people are unwavering in their commitment to
return China to its natural state of glory, thereby achieving the Chinese
Dream.
This goal is hardly
unique to Xi Jinping. Indeed, the explicit goal of rejuvenation goes at least
as far back as Sun Yet-sen, and has been invoked by almost every modern Chinese
leader from Chiang Kai-Shek to Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. In this way, leaders
have used national rejuvenation as a grand goal to mobilize the Chinese
population to support the revolution or reforms they launched. In making these
efforts, they have helped transform China into the modern and more powerful
nation it is today. Far from weakening their resolve, however, China’s
impressive new achievements have only strengthened its citizens’ commitment to
achieving the Chinese Dream.
It bears noting that the
Chinese Dream is in many ways the polar opposite of the more widely understood
American Dream. Specifically, whereas the American Dream emphasizes individuals
attaining personal enrichment and success, the Chinese Dream is a collective
undertaking that calls upon Chinese citizens to make personal sacrifices in
order to serve the greater, national good. If there is an appropriate parallel
in the U.S. it would not be the American Dream but President John F. Kennedy’s appeal to the American people to “ask not what your country can do
for you–ask what you can do for your country.”
Although the meaning of
the Chinese Dream is practical and intuitively understood at home, it has the
unfortunate consequence of remaining opaque to non-Chinese. Given that the
Chinese Dream is deeply rooted in history— in particular on China’s
interpretation of history which may differ in crucial ways from Japan or the
United States’ own teachings of that history—there is an unavoidable chasm
between how China perceives the Chinese Dream and how foreign audiences do. Not
only do many non-Chinese lack a strong understanding of Chinese history, but
many are not accustomed to drawing such a strong connection between historical
events and current affairs.
This varying historical
consciousness of different countries creates a perception gap. One need only look at the differences between how
Chinese and Japanese students learn important historic events. For example,
whereas Chinese students learn all the details about the Sino-Japanese War,
Japanese history textbooks contain very little information on the war, so
younger generations do not know much about that part of history. The Chinese
youth are emotional in regard to the territorial dispute because they connect
the current standoff with past humiliations, but the Japanese consider these
completely separate issues. The Japanese indifference
towards historical issues in turn
further infuriates the Chinese.
These different historical memories have
caused misperceptions between China and some of its neighbors over other
sovereignty issues. For example, it seems inconceivable to the Philippines and
Vietnam that China’s historical evidence of sovereignty over islands in the
South China Sea should take precedent over modern international law.
Consequently, these countries and others perceive China’s claims and efforts to
defend them as inherently aggressive.
By contrast, the Chinese
see their country as a status-quo power whose actions are inherently defensive.
From this perspective, the Chinese are merely trying to protect their ancestral
rights— as laid out in historical documents— from the encroachment of others.
Far from seeking to gain an advantage over others, the Chinese are simply
restoring the justice that was previously shattered by Western colonial powers.
This is why many ordinary Chinese are outraged when they perceive their
government as not being assertive enough in defending these rights.
Concurrently with
pursuing the Chinese Dream, Xi has followed his predecessors in emphasizing the
importance of continuing the policy of reform and opening up that Deng Xiaoping
initiated two decades ago. Indeed, shortly after becoming the CCP's new leader,
Xi gave a well-publicized speech in which he discussed the importance a nation
must place on choosing the right path because a nation’s path is its “destiny.”
Notably, Xi delivered this speech just before launching an extensive tour of Guangdong
Province that mirrored the
Southern Tour Deng had taken twenty years ago when his reform and opening up
policies had stalled.
The timing of Xi’s speech
on choosing the correct national path was a strong reaffirmation that Xi is
committed to advancing Deng’s policies. This is undoubtedly the right choice;
China has arguably benefited more than any other nation from the process of
globalization, and embracing globalization has empowered China to the point
where it can realistically aspire to fulfilling the Chinese Dream in a
definitive time period.
However, in order to
continue and deepen China’s reform and opening policy, Xi and his colleagues
must break with their predecessors in finally acknowledging the inherent
tension that exists between cultivating blind nationalism at home while
embracing globalization abroad. They should be aware that patriotism can easily
become nationalism, and an overly nationalistic
foreign policy will antagonize China’s trading partners and undercut economic development.
The Chinese are pursuing
the dream of rejuvenating the nation in the 21st century. In this process,
however, China must not only modernize its financial system and infrastructure,
such as railways, but also strengthen its political institutions and education
system. Chinese elites should recognize that their dream of restoring China’s
long lost glory should actually be geared toward a realistic, less
nationalistic goal of nation building. At the same time, they should work on
helping the outside world understand what exactly the Chinese Dream is. Only by
doing this can the Chinese Dream be comprehended and blessed by China’s
neighbors and the international community.
